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Abstract
In this paper we settle the sampling complexity of solving discounted two-player turn-based
zero-sum stochastic games up to polylogarithmic factors. Given a stochastic game with dis-
count factor γ ∈ (0, 1) we provide an algorithm that computes an ǫ-optimal strategy with high-
probability given O˜((1−γ)−3ǫ−2) samples from the transition function for each state-action-pair.
Our algorithm runs in time nearly linear in the number of samples and uses space nearly linear
in the number of state-action pairs. As stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes
(MDPs) our runtime and sample complexities are optimal due to Azar et al. (2013). We achieve
our results by showing how to generalize a near-optimal Q-learning based algorithms for MDP,
in particular Sidford et al. (2018a), to two-player strategy computation algorithms. This over-
comes limitations of standard Q-learning and strategy iteration or alternating minimization
based approaches and we hope will pave the way for future reinforcement learning results by
facilitating the extension of MDP results to multi-agent settings with little loss.
∗Supported by NSF CAREER Award CCF-184485
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the sample complexity of learning a near-optimal strategy in discounted
two-player turn-based zero-sum stochastic games Shapley (1953); Hansen et al. (2013), which we
refer to more concisely as stochastic games. Stochastic games model dynamic strategic settings
in which two players take turns and the state of game evolves stochastically according to some
transition law. This model encapsulates a major challenge in multi-agent learning: other agents
may be learning and adapting as well. Further, stochastic games are a generalization of the Markov
decision process (MDP), a fundamental model for reinforcement learning, to the two-player setting
Littman (1994). MDPs can be viewed as degenerate stochastic games in which one of the players
has no influence. Consequently, understanding stochastic games is a natural step towards resolving
challenges in reinforcement learning of extending single-agent learning to multi-agent settings.
There is a long line of research in both MDPs and stochastic games (for a more thorough in-
troduction, see Filar and Vrieze (2012); Hansen et al. (2013) and references therein). Strikingly,
Hansen et al. (2013) showed that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium which can be com-
puted in strongly polynomial time for stochastic games, if the game matrix is fully accessible and
the discount factor is fixed. In reinforcement learning settings, however, the transition function
of the game is unknown and a common goal is to obtain an approximately optimal strategy (a
function that maps states to actions) that is able to obtain an expected cumulative reward of at
least (or at most) the Nash equilibrium value no matter what the other player does. Unfortunately,
despite interest in generalizing MDP results to stochastic games, currently the best known running
times/sample complexity for solving stochastic games in a variety of settings are worse than for
solving MDPs. This may not be surprising since in general stochastic games are harder to solve than
MDPs, e.g., whereas MDPS can be solved in (weakly) polynomial time it remains open whether or
not the same can be done for stochastic games.
There are two natural approaches towards achieving sample complexity bounds for solving
stochastic games. The first is to note that the popular stochastic value iteration, dynamic program-
ming, and Q-learning methods all apply to stochastic games Littman (1994); Hu and Wellman
(2003); Littman (2001a); Perolat et al. (2015). Consequently, recent advances in these methods
Kearns and Singh (1999); Sidford et al. (2018b) developed for MDPs can be directly generalized
to solving stochastic games (though the sample complexity of these generalized methods has not
been analyzed previously). It is tempting to generalize the analysis of sample optimal methods
for estimating values Azar et al. (2013) and estimating policies Sidford et al. (2018a) of MDPs to
stochastic games. However, this is challenging as these methods rely on monotonicities in MDPs
induced by the linear program nature of the problem Azar et al. (2013); Sidford et al. (2018a).
The second approach would be to apply strategy iteration or alternating minimization / max-
imization to reduce solving stochastic games to approximately solving a sequence of MDPs. Un-
fortunately, the best analysis of such a method Hansen et al. (2013) requires solving Ω(1/(1 − γ))
MDPs. Consequently, even if this approach could be carried out with approximate MDP solvers,
the resulting sample complexity for solving stochastic games would be larger than that needed for
solving MDPs. More discussion of related literatures is given in Section 1.4.
Given the importance of solving stochastic games in reinforcement learning (e.g. Hu et al.
(1998); Bowling and Veloso (2000, 2001); Hu and Wellman (2003); Arslan and Yu¨ksel (2017)), this
suggests the following fundamental open problem:
Can we design stochastic game learning algorithms that provably match the performance of MDP
algorithms and achieve near-optimal sample complexities?
2
In this paper, we answer this question in the affirmative in the particular case of solving dis-
counted stochastic games with a generative model, i.e. an oracle for sampling from the transition
function for state-action pairs. We provide an algorithm with the same near-optimal sample com-
plexity that is known for solving discounted MDPs. Further, we achieve this result by showing how
to transform particular MDP algorithms to solving stochastic games that satisfy particular two-
sided monotonicity constraints. Therefore, while there is a major gap between MDPs and stochastic
games in terms of computation time for obtaining the exact solutions, this gap disappears when
considering the sampling complexity between the two. We hope this work opens the door to more
generally extend results for MDP to stochastic games and thereby enable the application of the
rich research on reinforcement learning to a broader multi-player settings with little overhead.
1.1 The Model
Formally, throughout this paper, we consider discounted turn-based two-player zero-sum stochastic
games described as the tuple G = (Smin,Smax,A,P , r, γ). In these games there are two players,
a min or minimization player which seeks to minimize the cumulative reward in the game and a
max or maximization player which seeks to maximize the cumulative reward. Here, Smin and Smax
are disjoint finite sets of states controlled by the min-player and the max-player respectively and
their union S := Smin ∪ Smax is the set of all possible states of the game. Further, A is a finite
set of actions available at each state, P : S × A × S 7→ [0, 1] is a transition probability function,
r : S × A 7→ [0, 1] is the payoff or reward function and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.1
Stochastic games G = (Smin,Smax,A,P , r, γ) are played dynamically in a sequence of turns,
{t}∞t=0, starting from some initial state s0 ∈ S at turn t = 0. In each turn t ≥ 0, the game is in one
of the states st ∈ S and the player who controls the state st chooses or plays an action at from the
action space A. This action yields reward rt := r(st, at) for the turn and causes the next state st+1
to be chosen at random from S where the transition probability Pr[st+1 = s′|s1, ..., st, a1, ..., at] =
P (s′ | st, at). The goal of the min-player (resp. max-player) is to choose actions to minimize (resp.
maximize) the expected infinite-horizon discounted-reward or value of the game
∑∞
t=0 γ
trt.
In this paper we focus on the case where the players play pure (deterministic) stationary strate-
gies (policies), i.e. strategies which depend only on the current state. That is we wish to compute
a min-player strategy or policy πmin : Smin → A which defines the action the min player chooses at
a state in Smin and max-player strategy πmax : Smax → A which defines the action the max player
chooses at a state in Smax. We call a pair of min-player and max-player strategies σ = (πmin, πmax)
simply a strategy. Further, we let σ(s) := πmin(s) for s ∈ Smin and σ(s) := πmax(s) for s ∈ Smax
and define the value function or expected discounted cumulative reward by vσ where
vσ(s) = v[σ](s) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, σ(st))
∣∣∣ s0 = s] for all s ∈ S
and the expectation is over the random sequence of states, s0, s1, s2, . . . generated according to P
under the strategy σ, i.e. Pr[st+1 = s′ | st, st−1, ...., s0] = P (s′ | st, σ(st)) for all t > 0.
Our goal in solving a game is to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium restricted to sta-
tionary strategies Nash (1951); Maskin and Tirole (2001). We call a strategy σ = (πmin, πmax) an
1Standard reductions allow this result to be applied for rewards of a broader range Sidford et al. (2018a). Further,
while we assume there are the same number of actions per-state, our results easily extend to the case where this is
non-uniform; in this case our dependencies on |S||A| can be replaced with the number of state-action pairs.
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equilibrium strategy or optimal if
max
pi′max:Smax→A
v(pimin,pi
′
max) ≤ vσ ≤ min
pi′min:Smin→A
v(pi
′
min,pimax).
and we call it ǫ-optimal if these same inequalities hold up to an additive ǫ entrywise. It is worth
noting that the best response strategy to a stationary policy is also stationary Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) and there always exists a pure stationary strategy attaining the Nash equilibrium Shapley
(1953). Consequently, it is sufficient to focus on deterministic strategies.
Throughout this paper we focus on solving stochastic games in the learning setting where the
game is not fully specified. We assume that a generative model is available which given any state-
action pair, i.e. s ∈ S and a ∈ A, can sample a random s′ independently at random from the
transition probability function, i.e. Pr[s′ = t] = P (t | s, a). Accessibility to a generative model
is a standard and natural assumption (Kakade (2003); Azar et al. (2013); Sidford et al. (2018a);
Agarwal et al. (2019)) and corresponds to PAC learning. The special case of solving a MDP given
a generative model has been studied extensively (Kakade (2003); Azar et al. (2013); Sidford et al.
(2018b,a); Agarwal et al. (2019)) and is a natural proving ground towards designing theoretically
motivated reinforcement learning algorithms.
1.2 Our Results
In this paper we provide an algorithm that computes an ǫ-optimal strategy using a sample size that
matches the best known sample complexity for solving discounted MDPs. Further, our algorithm
runs in time proportional to the number of samples and space proportional to |S||A|. Interest-
ingly, we achieve this result by showing how to run two-player variant of Q-learning such that
the value-strategy sequences induced enjoy certain monotonicity properties. Essentially, we show
that provided a value improving algorithm is sufficiently stable, then it can be extended to the
two-player setting with limited loss. This allows us to leverage recent advances in solving single
player games to solve stochastic games with limited overhead. Our main result is given below.
Theorem 1.1 (Main Theorem). There is an algorithm which given a stochastic game, G =
(Smin,Smax,P , r, γ) with a generative model, outputs, with probability at least 1 − δ, an ǫ-optimal
strategy σ by querying Z = O˜(|S||A|(1− γ)−3ǫ−2) samples, where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and O˜(·) hides polylog-
arithmic factors. The algorithm runs in time O(Z) and uses space O(|S||A|).
Our sample and time complexities are optimal due to a known lower bound in the single player
case by Azar et al. (2013). It was shown in Azar et al. (2013) that solving any one-player MDP
to ǫ-optimality with high probability needs at least Ω(|S||A|(1 − γ)−3ǫ−2) samples. Our sample
complexity upper bound generalizes the recent sharp sample complexity results for solving the
discounted MDP Sidford et al. (2018a); Agarwal et al. (2019), and tightly matches the information-
theoretic sample complexity up to polylogarithmic factors. This result provides the first and near-
optimal sample complexity for solving the two-person stochastic game.
1.3 Notations and Preliminaries
Notation: We use 1 to denote the all-ones vector whose dimension is adapted to the context. We
use the operators | · |, (·)2,√·,≤,≥ as entrywise operators on vectors. We identify the transition
probability function P as a matrix in R(S×A)×S and each row P (· | s, a) ∈ RS as a vector. We
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denote v as a vector in RS and Q as a vector in RS×A. Therefore Pv is a vector in RS×A. We use
σ to denote strategy pairs and π for the min-player or max-player strategy. For any strategy σ, we
define Qσ ∈ RS as Qσ(s) := Q(s, σ(s)) for ∀s ∈ S. We denote P σ as a linear operator defined as
∀s ∈ S : [P σv](s) = P (· | s, σ(s))⊤v, and ∀s, a ∈ S ×A : [P σQ](s, a) = P (· | s, a)⊤Qσ.
Min-value and max-value: For a min-player strategy πmin, we define its value as
vpimin := max
pimax : Smax→A
v(pimin,pimax), (1)
We let σmax(πmin) denote a maximizing argument of the above and call it an optimal counter
strategy of πmin. Thus a value of a min-player strategy gives his expected reward in the worst case.
We say a min-player strategy πmin is ǫ-optimal if
vpimin ≤ min
pi′min : Smin→A
vpi
′
min + ǫ · 1, entrywisely.
The value and ǫ-optimality for the max player is defined similarly. We denote by σ∗ the optimal
strategy and by v∗ the value function of the optimal strategy.
Q-function: For a strategy σ, we denote its Q-function (or action value) as Qσ ∈ RS×A by
Qσ := r+ γPvσ. For a vector v ∈ RS we denote Q(v) := r+ γPv. Given a Q ∈ RS×A, we denote
the greedy value of Q as
V [Q](s) := min
a∈A
Q(s, a) if s ∈ Smin and V [Q](s) := max
a∈A
Q(s, a) if s ∈ Smax.
Bellman Operator: We denote the Bellman operator, T , as follows: T [v] ∈ RS , and
T [v](s) := V [r + γPv].
We also denote the greedy strategy, σ(v) or σ(Q), as the maximization/minimization argument of
the T operator. Moreover, for a given strategy σ, we denote Tσ[v] = Q(v)σ. For a given min-player
strategy πmin, we define the half Bellman operator Hpimin
Hpimin[v] = r(s, πmin(s)) + γP (· | s, πmin(s))⊤v if s ∈ Smin; T [v](s) if s ∈ Smax.
We define Hpimax similarly. Note that v∗ is the unique fixed point of the Bellman operator, i.e.,
T [v∗] = v∗ (known as the Bellman equation Bellman (1957)). Similarly, vpimin (resp. vpimax) is
the unique fixed point for Hpimin (resp. Hpimax). The (half) Bellman-operators satisfy the following
properties (see. e.g. Hansen et al. (2013); Puterman (2014))
1. contraction: ‖T [v1]− T [v2]‖∞ ≤ γ‖v1 − v2‖∞;
2. monotonicity : v1 ≤ v2 ⇒ T [v1] ≤ T [v2].
High Probability: we say an algorithm has a property “with high probability” if for any δ by
increasing the time and sample complexity by O(log(1/δ)) it has the property with probability
1− δ.
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1.4 Previous Work
Here we provide a more detailed survey of previous works related to stochastic games and MDPs.
Two-person stochastic games generalize MDPs Shapley (1953). When one of the players has only
one action to choose from, the problem reduces to a MDP. A related game is the stochastic game
where both players choose their respective actions simultaneously at each state and the process
transitions to the next state under the control of both players Shapley (1953). The turn-based
stochastic game can be reduced to the game with simultaneous moves Pe´rolat et al. (2015).
Computing an optimal strategy for a two-player turn-based zero-sum stochastic game is known
to be in NP ∩ co-NP Condon (1992). Later Hansen et al. (2013) showed that the strategy itera-
tion, a generalization of Howard’s policy iteration algorithm Howard (1960), solves the discounted
problem in strongly polynomial time when the discount factor is fixed. Their work uses ideas from
Ye (2011) which proved that the policy iteration algorithm solves the discounted MDP (DMDP) in
strongly polynomial time when the discount factor is fixed. In general (e.g., if the discount factor
is part of the input size), it is open if stochastic games can be solved in polynomial time Littman
(1996). This is in contrast to MDPs which can be solved in (weakly) polynomial time as they are
a special case of linear programming.
The algorithms and complexity theory for solving two-player stochastic games is closely re-
lated to that of solving MDPs. Their is vast literature on solving MDPs which dates back to
Bellman who developed value iteration in 1957 Bellman (1957). The policy iteration was intro-
duced shortly after by Howard Howard (1960), and its complexity has been extensive studied in
Mansour and Singh (1999); Ye (2011); Scherrer (2013). Then d’Epenoux (1963) and De Ghellinck
(1960) discovered that MDPs are special cases of a linear program, which leads to the insight that
the simplex method, when applied to solving DMDPs, is a simple policy iteration method. Ye
Ye (2011) showed that policy iteration (which is a variant of the general simplex method for lin-
ear programming) and the simplex method are strongly polynomial for DMDP and terminate in
O(|S|2|A|(1−γ)−1 log(|S|(1−γ)−1)) iterations. Hansen et al. (2013) and Scherrer (2013) improved
the iteration bound to O(|S||A|(1 − γ)−1 log(|S|(1 − γ)−1)) for Howard’s policy iteration method.
The best known convergence result for policy and strategy iteration are given by Ye (2005) and
Hansen et al. (2013). The best known iteration complexities for both problems are of the order
(1 − γ)−1, which becomes unbounded as γ → 1. It is worth mentioning that Ye (2005) designed a
combinatorial interior-point algorithm (CIPA) that solves the DMDP in strongly polynomial time.
Sample-based algorithms for learning value and policy functions for MDP have been stud-
ied in Kearns and Singh (1999); Kakade (2003); Singh and Yee (1994); Azar et al. (2011b, 2013);
Sidford et al. (2018b,a); Agarwal et al. (2019) and many others. Among these papers, Azar et al.
(2013) obtains the first tight sample bound for finding an ǫ-optimal value function and for finding
ǫ-optimal policies in a restricted ǫ regime and Sidford et al. (2018a) obtains the first tight sam-
ple bound for finding an ǫ-optimal policy for any ǫ. Both sample complexities are of the form
O˜[|S||A|(1 − γ)−3]. Lower bounds have been shown in Azar et al. (2011a); Even-Dar et al. (2006)
and Azar et al. (2013). Azar et al. (2013) give the first tight lower bound Ω[|S||A|(1 − γ)−3]. For
undiscounted average-reward MDP, a primal-dual based method was proposed in Wang (2017)
which achieves sample complexity O˜(|S||A|t2mixc2max/c2min), where tmix is the worst-case mixing time
and cmax/cmin is the ergodicity ratio. Sampling-based method for two-player stochastic game has
been considered in Wei et al. (2017) in an online learning setting. However, their algorithm leads
to a sub-optimal sample-complexity when generalized to the generative model setting.
As for general stochastic games, the minimax Q-learning algorithm and the friend-and-foe Q-
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learning algorithm were introduced in Littman (1994) and Littman (2001a), respectively. The
Nash Q-learning algorithm was proposed for zero-sum games in Hu and Wellman (2003) and for
general-sum games in Littman (2001b); Hu and Wellman (1999).
2 Technique Overview
Since stochastic games are a generalization of MDPs, many techniques for solving MDPs can be
immediately generalized to stochastic games. However, as we have discussed, some of the techniques
used to achieve optimal sample complexities for solving MDPs in a generative model do not have
a clear generalization to stochastic games. Nevertheless, we show how to design an algorithm
that carefully extends particular Q-learning based methods, i.e. methods that always maintain an
estimator for the optimal value function (or Q∗), to achieve our goals.
Q-Learning: To motivate our approach we first briefly review previous Q-learning based meth-
ods and the core technique that achieves near-optimal sample complexity. To motivate Q-learning,
we first recall the value iteration algorithm solving an MDP. Given a full model for the MDP value
iteration updates the iterates as follows
v(i) ← T [v(i−1)] := V [Q(v(i−1))]
where v(0) can be an arbitrary vector. Since the Bellman operator is contractive and v∗ is a fix
point of T , this method gives an ǫ-optimal value in O[(1− γ)−1 log(ǫ−1)] iterations. In the learning
setting, T cannot be exactly computed. The Q-learning approach estimates T by its approximate
version, i.e., to compute P (· | s, a)⊤v(i−1), we obtain samples from P (· | s, a), and then compute
the empirical average. Then we compute the approximate Q-value at the i-th iteration as
Q(i) = Q̂[v(i−1)] := r + P̂ v(i−1) and T̂ (v(i−1)) := V [Q̂(v(i−1))],
where
P̂ (· | s, a)⊤v = 1
m
∑
si∼P (·|s,a), i∈[m]
v(si)
for some m > 0. Then the estimation error per step is defined as
ǫ(i) = Q[v(i−1)]− Q̂[v(i−1)].
Since the exact value iteration takes at least Ω[(1− γ)−1] iterations to converge, the Q-learning (or
approximated value iteration) takes at least Ω[(1− γ)−1] iterations. The total number of samples
used over all the iterations is the sample complexity of the algorithm.
Variance Control and Monotonicity Techniques: To obtain the optimal sample complexity
for one-player MDP, one approach is to carefully bound each entry of ǫ(i). By Bernstein inequality
(Azar et al. (2013); Sidford et al. (2018a); Agarwal et al. (2019)), we have, with high probability,
|ǫ(i)| .
√
var(v(i−1))/m ≤
√
var(v∗)/m+ lower-order terms.
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where var(v) = Pv2 − (Pv)2 is the variance-of-value vector and “.” means “approximately less
than.” Let π(i) be a policy maintained in the i-th iteration (e.g. the greedy policy of the current
Q-value). Due to the estimation error ǫ(i), the per step error bound reads,
Q∗ −Q(i) . γP pi∗Q∗ − γP pi(i−1)Q(i−1) + ǫ(i).
To derive the overall error accumulation, Sidford et al. (2018a) use the crucial monotonicity prop-
erty, i.e., since π(i−1)(s) = argmaxaQ
(i−1)(s, a), we have
Q(i−1)(s, π∗(s)) ≤ Q(i)(s, π(i−1)(s)). (2)
We thus have
Q∗ −Q(i) . γP pi∗Q∗ − γP pi∗Q(i−1) + ǫ(i).
By induction, we have
Q∗ −Q(i) ≤ (I − γP pi∗)−1
√
var(v∗)/m+ lower-order terms. (3)
The leading-order error accumulation term (I − γP pi∗)−1
√
var(v∗)/m satisfies the so-called total
variance property, and can be upper bounded uniformly by
√
(1− γ)−3m−1, resulting the correct
dependence on (1− γ). Therefore the monotonicity property allows us to use π∗ as a proxy policy,
which carefully bounds the error accumulation. For the additional subtlety of how to obtain an
optimal policy, please refer to Sidford et al. (2018a) for the variance reduction technique and the
monotone-policy technique.
Similar observations regarding MDPs was used in Agarwal et al. (2019) as well. This powerful
technique, however, does not generalize to the game case due to the lack of monotonicity. Indeed,
(2) does not hold for stochastic games due to the existence of both minimization and maximization
operations in the Bellman operator. This is the critical issue which this paper seeks to overcome.
Finding Monotone Value-Strategy Sequences for Stochastic Games: Analogously to the
MDP case, one approach is to bound error accumulation for stochastic games is to bound each
entry of the error vector ǫ(i) carefully. In fact, our method for solving stochastic games is very
much like the MDP method used in Sidford et al. (2018a). However, the analysis is much different
in order to resolve the difficulty introduced by the lack of monotonicity.
Since a stochastic game has two players, we modify the variance reduced Q-value iteration
(vQVI) method in Sidford et al. (2018a) to obtain a min-player strategy and a max-player strat-
egy respectively. Since the two players are symmetric, let us focus on introducing and analyzing
the algorithm for the min-player. By a slight modification of the vQVI method, we can guaran-
tee to obtain a sequence of strategies and values, {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0, that satisfy, with high
probability,
1. v(0) ≥ v(1) ≥ . . . v(R) ≥ v∗;
2. Tσ(i) [v(i)] ≤ v(i),T [v(i)] ≤ v(i),Hpi(i)min[v
(i)] ≤ v(i);
3. Q(i) ≤ Q[v(i−1)] + ǫ(i);
4. v(i) ≤ V [Q(i)].
(4)
where σ(i) = (π
(i)
max, π
(i)
min). The first property guarantees that the value sequences are monotonically
decreasing, the second property guarantees v(i) is always an upper bound of the value vpi
(i)
min, and the
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third and fourth inequality guarantees that v(i) is well approximated by V [Q(i)] and the estimation
error satisfy
|ǫ(i)| .
√
var(v(i))/m,
where m is the total number of samples used per state-action pair. Note that, as long as we can
guarantee that v(R) − v∗ ≤ ǫ, we can guarantee the min-strategy π(R)min is also good:
v∗ ≤ vpi(R)min ≤ v(R).
Controlling Error Accumulation using Auxiliary Markovian Strategy: Due to the lack
of monotonicity (2), we cannot use the optimal strategy σ∗ as a proxy strategy to carefully account
for the error accumulation. To resolve this issue, we construct a new proxy strategy σ∞. This
strategy is a Markovian strategy, which is time-dependent but not history dependent, i.e., at time
t, the strategy played is a deterministic map σ∞t : S → A. The proxy strategy satisfies the following:
1. Underestimation. its value, v[σ∞i ], (expected discounted cumulative reward starting from
any time) is upper bounded by v∗;
2. Contraction. v(i)(s)− v[σ∞i ](s) ≤ γP (·|s, σ∞i (s))⊤
(
v(i−1) − v[σ∞i−1]
)
+ ǫ(i)(s, σ∞i (s)),
Similarly, we can bound the error ǫ(i)(s, σ∞i (s)) by the variance-of-value of the proxy strategy
ǫ(i)(s, σ∞i (s)) ≤
√
var(v[σ∞i ])(s, σ
∞
i (s))/m+ lower-order terms.
Based on the first property, we can upper bound
v(i) − v∗ ≤ v(i) − v[σ∞i ].
Based on the second property, and induction on i, we can now write a new form of error accumu-
lation,
v(R) − v∗ .
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
∞
R · P σ∞R−1 · . . . · P σ∞i+1
√
var(v[σ∞i−1])σ∞i /m+ lower-order terms,
where var(v[σ∞i−1])σ∞i (s) := var(v[σ
∞
i ])(s, σ
∞
i (s)) for all s ∈ S. We derive a new law of total
variance bound for the first term and ultimately prove an error accumulation upper bound:
v(R) − v∗ .
√
(1− γ)−3m+ lower-order terms,
giving the optimal sample bound.
3 Sample Complexity of Stochastic Games
In this section, we provide and analyze our sampling-based algorithm for solving stochastic games.
Recall that we have a generative model for the game such that we can obtain samples from state-
action pairs. Each sample is obtained in time O(1). As such we care about the total number of
samples used or the total amount of time consumed by the algorithm. We will provide an efficient
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algorithm that takes input a generative model and obtains a good strategy for the underlying
stochastic game.
We now describe the algorithm. Since the min-player and max-player are symmetric, let us
focus on the min-player strategy. For the max player strategy, we can either consider the game
G′ = (Smin,Smax,P ,1−r, γ), in which the roles of the max and min players switched, or use the
corresponding algorithm for the max-player defined in Section 4.4, an algorithm that is a direct
generalization from the min-player algorithm.
The Full Algorithm. For simplicity, let us denote β = 1/(1 − γ). Our full algorithm will use
the QVI-MDVSS algorithm (Algorithm 1) as a subroutine. As we will show shortly, this subroutine
maintains a monotonic value strategy sequence with high probability. Suppose the algorithm is
specified by an accuracy parameter ǫ ∈ (0, 1]. We initialize a value vector v(0) = β 1, and an
arbitrary strategy σ(0) = (π
(0)
min, π
(0)
max). Let u(0) = β. Then our initial value and strategy satisfy the
requirement of the input specified by Algorithm 1:
v∗ ≤ v(0) ≤ v∗ + u(0) 1, v(0) ≥ T [v(0)], and v(0) ≥ Tσ(0) [v(0)];
Let u(j) ← β/2j and δ ← 1/poly(log(β/ǫ)). We run Algorithm 1 repeatedly:
(v(j+1), σ(j+1))← QVI-MDVSS← (v(j), σ(j), u(j), δ), (6)
where σ(j) = (π
(j)
min, π
(j)
max) and we take the terminal value and strategy of the output sequence of
Algorithm 1 as the input for the next iteration. In total we run (6) R′ = Θ(log(β/ǫ)) iterations. In
the end, we output π
(R′)
min from σ
(R′) = (π
(R′)
min , π
(R′)
max) as our min-player strategy.
The formal guarantee of the algorithm is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Restatement of Theorem 1.1). Given a stochastic game G = (Smin,Smax,P , r, γ)
with a generative model, there exists (constructively) an algorithm that outputs, with probability at
least 1 − δ, an ǫ-optimal strategy σ by querying Z = O˜(|S||A|(1 − γ)−3ǫ−2) samples in time O(Z)
using space O(|S||A|) where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and O˜(·) hides poly log[|S||A|/(1 − γ)/ǫ/δ] factors.
The formal proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in the next section. Here we give a sketch of the proof.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3.1: We first show the high-level idea. Considering one iteration
of (6), we claim that if the input value and strategy σ(j),v(j), u(j) satisfies the input condition
(5), then with probability at least 1 − δ, the terminal value and strategy of the output sequence,
σ(j+1),v(j+1), satisfies,
vpi
j+1
min ≤ vj+1 ≤ v∗ + u(j) 1 /2 =: v∗ + u(j+1) 1; (7)
and (σ(j+1),v(j+1), u(j+1)) satisfies the the input condition (5). Namely, with high probability, the
error of the output is decreased by at least half and the output can be used as an input to the
QVI-MDVSS algorithm again. Suppose we run the subroutine of Algorithm 1 for R′ times, and
conditioning on the event that all the instances of QVI-MDVSS succeed, the final error of π
(R′)
min is
then at most u(R
′) = 2−R
′
β = ǫ, as desired. By setting δ = δ′/R′ for some δ′ > 0, we have that
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all QVI-MDVSS instances succeed with probability at least 1 − δ′. It remains to show that the
algorithm QVI-MDVSS works as claimed.
High-level Structure of Algorithm 1. To outline the proof, we denote a monotone decreas-
ing value-strategy sequence (MDVSS) as {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0, satisfying (4), where v(i), ǫ(i) ∈
R
S ,Q(i) ∈ RS×A and σ(i) = (π(i)min, π(i)max) ∈ AS . A more formal treatment of the sequence is
presented in Section 4.2.
We next introduce the high-level idea of Algorithm 1. The basic step of the algorithm is to do
approximate value-iteration while preserving all monotonic properties required by an MDVSS, i.e.,
we would like to approximate
Q(i) = Q[v(i−1)] := r + Pv(i−1) and T [v(i−1)] := V [Q(v(i−1))].
We would like to approximate Pv(i−1) using samples, but we do not want to use the same amount of
samples per iteration (as it become costly if the number of iterations is large). Instead, we compute
only the first iteration (i.e., estimate Pv(0)) up to high accuracy with a large number of samples
(m1 samples, defined in Line 10). These computations are presented in Line 17-23. To maintain
an upper bound of the of the estimation error, we also compute the empirical variances of the
updates in Line 19. We shift upwards our estimates by the estimation error upper bounds to make
our estimators one-sided, which is crucial to maintain the MDVSS properties. For the subsequent
steps (Line 29 - 40), we use m2 samples per iteration (m2 ≪ m1) to estimate P (v(i) − v(0)). The
expectation is that (v(i) − v(0)) has a small ℓ∞ norm, and hence P (v(i) − v(0)) can be estimated
up to high accuracy with only a small number of samples. The estimator of P (v(i) − v(0)) plus
the estimator of Pv(0) in the initialization steps gives a high-accuracy estimator (Line 40) for the
value iteration. Since m2 ≪ m1, the total number of samples per state-action pair is dominated
by m1. This idea is formally known as variance-reduction, firstly proposed for solving MDP in
Sidford et al. (2018b). Similarly, we shift our estimators to be one-sided. We additionally maintain
carefully-designed strategies in Line 29-31 to preserve monotonicity. Hence the algorithm can be
viewed as a value-strategy iteration algorithm.
Correctness of Algorithm 1. We now sketch the proof of correctness for Algorithm 1. Firstly
Proposition (4.3) shows that the if an MDVSS, e.g., {v+(i),Q+(i), σ+(i), ǫ+(i)}Ri=0, satisfies ‖v+(R)−
v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ for some ǫ > 0 then their terminal strategies and values satisfy
vpi
+(R)
min ≤ v+(R) ≤ v∗ + ǫ1 .
This indicates that as long as we can show ǫ ≤ u/2, then the halving-error-property (7) holds.
Proposition 4.4 shows the halving-error-property can be achieved by setting
ǫ+(i) .
√
var(v+(0))/m+ lower-order terms,
where var(v+(0)) is the variance-of-value vector of v+(0) and m &
√
β3u−2. This proof is based on
constructing an auxiliary Markovian strategy for analyzing the error accumulation throughout the
value-strategy iterations. The Markovian strategy is a time-dependent strategy used as a proxy for
analyzing the entrywise error recursion (Lemmas 4.4-4.11).
Proposition 4.12 shows, with high probability, Algorithm 1 produces value-strategy sequences
{v+(i),Q+(i), σ+(i), ξ+(i)}Ri=0, which is indeed an MDVSS and ξ+(i) satisfies Proposition 4.4. The
proof involves analyzing the probability of “good events” on which monotonicity is preserved at
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every iteration by using confidence estimates computed during the iterations and concentration
arguments. See Lemmas 4.13-4.18 for the full proof of Proposition 4.12.
Putting Everything Together. Finally by putting together the strategies, we conclude that the
terminal strategy of the iteration (6) is always an approximately optimal min-player strategy to
the game, with high probability. For implementation, since our algorithm only computes the inner
product based on samples, the total computation time is proportional to the number of samples.
Moreover, since we can update as samples are drawn and output the monotone sequences as they
are generated, we do not need to store samples or the value-strategy sequences, thus the overall
space is O(|S||A|).
4 Proof of Main Results
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 1.1. We prove this by formally
providing a notion of monotone value-strategy sequences. With this, we show if an algorithm
outputs some monotone value-strategy sequence, then the terminal strategy of the sequence is
always an approximately optimal strategy to the game. We then show that Algorithm 1 produces
monotone value-strategy sequences with high probability.
4.1 Additional Notation
First we provide additional notation critical to our proofs.
Markovian Strategies: We denote a Markovian strategy σ∞ as an infinitely long sequence of
pre-defined strategies
σ∞ := (σ1, σ2, . . .),
where each σi is a normal deterministic strategy. We denote
σ∞t = (σt, σt+1, . . .)
as another Markovian strategy. We denote σ∞min and σ
∞
max as the min-player strategy and the max-
player strategy respectively. When using the strategy, players uses σt at time t. The strategy is
Markovian because it does not depend on the historical moves. Note that a stationary strategy σ
is a special case of the Markovian strategy: σ = (σ, σ, σ, . . .). The value of a Markovian strategy
is defined as before, but the states are generated by playing the action σt(s
t) at time t. Since the
strategy has a time dependence, we denote
vσ
∞
t := v[σ
∞
t ] and Q
σ∞
t = r + γPv
σ∞
t+1.
The (half) Bellman operators are defined similarly to that of stationary policies.
4.2 Monotone Value-Strategy Sequence
In this section we formally define monotone strategy value sequences. Such a sequence, although
not explicitly stated in Sidford et al. (2018b,a), are crucial for these algorithms to obtain good
policy while obtaining a good value for an MDP. In the following sections, we denote m ≥ 1, L ≥ 1
and ǫ ∈ [0, (1 − γ)−1] as parameters. Monotone value-strategy sequences are formally defined as
follows.
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Definition 4.1 (Monotone Decreasing Value-Strategy Sequence). A monotone decreasing value-
strategy sequence (MDVSS) is a sequence of {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0 where v(i), ǫ(i) ∈ RS ,Q(i) ∈
R
S×A and σ(i) = (π
(i)
min, π
(i)
max) ∈ AS satisfy
1. v(0) ≥ v(1) ≥ . . . v(R) ≥ v∗;
2. ∀i ∈ [0, R], Tσ(i) [v(i)] ≤ v(i),T [v(i)] ≤ v(i),Hpi(i)min[v
(i)] ≤ v(i);
3. ∀i ∈ [R], Q(i) ≤ r + γPv(i−1) + ǫ(i);
4. ∀i ∈ [R], v(i) ≤ V [Q(i)].
Note that Q(0), ǫ(0) can be arbitrary.
Here, we explain the intuition of the sequence. The first property guarantees that the value-
estimator v(i)s always upper bound the optimal value. The second property guarantees that vpimin ≤
v(i). Indeed
vpimin = lim
t→∞
Htpimin[v(i)] ≤ v(i),
where Htpimin denotes applying Hpimin for t times. Therefore, as long as v(R) − v∗ ≤ ǫ1, we have
v∗ ≤ vpimin ≤ v∗ + ǫ1 .
The third and the fourth property guarantees v(R) is good by requiring that v(i) andQ(i) satisfy the
approximate value iteration with one-sided error. However the overall error v(R) − v∗ is controlled
by the per-step error term ǫ(i).
Similarly, we define monotone increasing value-strategy sequence(MIVSS) analagously with ev-
ery inequality reversed.
Definition 4.2 (Monotone Increasing Value-Strategy Sequence). A monotone increasing value-
strategy sequence (MIVSS) is a sequence of {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0 where v(i) ∈ RS ,Q(i) ∈ RS×A
and σ(i) ∈ AS that satisfies,
1. v(0) ≤ v(1) ≤ . . . v(R) ≤ v∗;
2. ∀i ∈ [0, R], Tσ(i) [v(i)] ≥ v(i),T v(i) ≥ [v(i)],Hpi(i)max [v
(i)] ≥ v(i);
3. ∀i ∈ [R], Q(i) ≥ r + γPv(i−1) − ǫ(i);
4. ∀i ∈ [R], v(i) ≥ V [Q(i)].
Note that Q(0), ǫ(0) can be arbitrary.
4.3 Monotone Value-Strategy Sequence Implies Good Strategy
Next, we show that MDVSS or MIVSS implies a good terminal value/strategy. First we show
that if the terminal value v(R) is close to the optimal value, then we are guaranteed to have good
strategies as well.
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Proposition 4.3. Suppose we have an MDVSS, {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0, with ‖v(R) − v∗‖∞ ≤ ǫ
for some ǫ ≥ 0. Then we have
vpi
(R)
min ≤ v∗ + ǫ1 .
Similarly, suppose {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0 is an MIVSS, then
vpi
(R)
max ≥ v∗ − ǫ1 .
Proof. By the property of an MDVSS, we have
vpi
(R)
min ≤ v(R).
Since v(R) ≤ v∗ + ǫ1, we prove the first inequality. The second inequality follows similarly.
Next we consider when it is the case we achieve a good terminal value. The following proposition
shows that an MDVSS(MVISS) with an appropriate error parameters has a better terminal value
than its initial value.
Proposition 4.4. Let u ∈ (0, β), β = (1 − γ)−1, R = Θ[β log(β/u)]. Suppose an MDVSS (or
MIVSS) {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0 satisfies
‖v(0) − v∗‖∞ ≤ u and ǫ(i) =
√
L · var(v(0))/m+ β · (L/m)3/4 + u/(CR),
for some large constant C > 1 and m ≥ 1. Then we have
‖v(R) − v∗‖∞ ≤ u/2 for m = Ω˜
(
1
min(1, u2) · (1− γ)3
)
.
Note that Proposition 4.4 shows that in an MDVSS/MIVSS, the distance to the optimal value of
the terminal value reduces by at least half of its initial value. Starting from some v(0) with distance
at most β to v∗, by concatenating O(log(β/ǫ)) many MDVSS/MIVSS’s, with the initial value of
one sequence set as the terminal value of the last sequence, an ǫ-optimal value can be obtained. The
remainder of this subsection devotes to proving the above proposition. Since MIVSS and MDVSS
are symmetric, in the following analysis, we focus on MDVSS and the analysis follows similarly for
MIVSS.
4.3.1 Auxiliary Markovian Strategy
Due to the lack of monotonicity we do not know how to use the optimal strategy σ∗ to carefully
account for the error accumulation of the MDVSS. To resolve this issue, we instead use the following
auxiliary Markovian strategy as such a proxy.
Definition 4.5 (Auxiliary Strategy). Given a MDVSS, {v(i),Q(i), σ(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0, we denote the
Markovian auxiliary strategy for the max-player as
π∞(i)auxmax = (π
(i)
auxmax, π
(i−1)
auxmax, . . . , π
(1)
auxmax, π
∗
max, π
∗
max, π
∗
max . . .),
where π
(i)
auxmax(s) = argmaxaQ
(i)(s, a) for s ∈ Smax. We denote the auxiliary strategy for the
min-player as
π
∞(i)
auxmin = σmin[π
∞(i)
auxmax] = (π
(i)
auxmin, π
(i−1)
auxmin, . . . , π
(1)
auxmin, π
∗
min, π
∗
min, π
∗
min . . .),
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which is the optimal counter Markovian policy of π
∞(i)
auxmax, i.e.,
∀s ∈ Smin : π∞(i)auxmin(s) = argmina
[
r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)⊤v[π∞(i−1)aux ]
]
.
We also denote
σ∞(i)aux =
[
(π
(i)
auxmin, π
(i)
auxmax), (π
(i−1)
auxmin, π
(i−1)
auxmax), . . . , (π
(1)
auxmin, π
(1)
auxmax), σ
∗, σ∗, σ∗ . . .
]
.
Furthermore, we denote σ
(i)
aux = (π
(i)
auxmin, π
(i)
auxmax) for i ≥ 1 and σ(i)aux = σ∗ for i ≤ 0.
For a Markovian strategy, we first show that the strategy has a value always smaller than the
optimal value.
Lemma 4.6. For all i ∈ [R], we have
v
[
σ∞(i)aux
] ≤ v∗.
Proof. Denote
σ˜∞(i)aux =
[
(π∗min, π
(i)
auxmax), (π
∗
min, π
(i−1)
auxmax), . . . , (π
∗
min, π
(1)
auxmax), σ
∗, σ∗, σ∗ . . .
]
.
Denote σ
∞(0)
aux = σ˜
∞(0)
aux = (σ∗, σ∗, . . . , ). We first show that for all i ∈ [R], v
[
σ
∞(i)
aux
] ≤ v[σ˜∞(i)aux ].
Indeed it holds trivially for i = 0. Suppose it holds for some i ≥ 0. Then, for each s ∈ Smin, we
have,
v[σ∞(i)aux ](s) = mina
[
r(s, a) + γP (· | s, a)⊤v(σ∞(i−1)aux )
]
≤ [r(s, σ∗(s)) + γP (· | s, σ∗(s))⊤v(σ∞(i−1)aux )]
≤ [r(s, σ∗(s)) + γP (· | s, σ∗(s))⊤v(σ˜∞(i−1)aux )] (due to v[σ∞(i−1)aux ] ≤ v[σ˜∞(i−1)aux ])
= v[σ˜∞(i)aux ](s).
For each s ∈ Smax, we have,
v[σ∞(i)aux ](s) =
[
r(s, σ(i)aux(s)) + γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤v(σ∞(i−1)aux )
]
≤ [r(s, σ(i)aux(s)) + γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤v(σ˜∞(i−1)aux )] (due to v[σ∞(i−1)aux ] ≤ v[σ˜∞(i−1)aux ])
= v[σ˜∞(i)aux ](s).
Now, since (π∗max, π
∗
max, . . .) is the optimal counter strategy of (π
∗
min, π
∗
min, . . .), we have
v[σ˜∞(i)aux ] ≤ v∗
holds similarly. This concludes the proof.
Consider the error vector ǫ(i). Recall that ǫ
(i)
σ
(i)
aux
denotes a vector in RS whose s-th entry is given
by ǫ(i)(s, σ
(i)
aux(s)). The next lemma shows a recursive relation between a Markovian strategy and
the corresponding MDVSS values.
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Lemma 4.7. For all i ∈ [R], we have
v(i) − v[σ∞(i)aux ] ≤ γP σ
(i)
aux
(
v(i−1) − v[σ∞(i−1)aux ]
)
+ ǫ
(i)
σ
(i)
aux
Proof. Note that v(i) ≥ v∗ ≥ v[σ∞(i)aux ]. For each s ∈ Smin, we have
v(i)(s) ≤ min
a
Q(i)(s, a) ≤ Q(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s))
≤ r(s, σ(i)aux(s)) + γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤v(i−1) + ǫ(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s)),
and
v[σ∞(i)aux ](s) = r(s, σ
(i)
aux(s)) + γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤v[σ∞(i−1)aux ].
Thus
v(i)(s)− v[σ∞(i)aux ](s) ≤ γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤
(
v(i−1) − v[σ∞(i−1)aux ]
)
+ ǫ(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s)).
Similarly, for each s ∈ Smax, we have, v(i)(s) ≤ maxaQ(i)(s, a) := Q(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s)), thus
v(i)(s)− v[σ∞(i)aux ](s) ≤ Q(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s))− v[σ∞(i)aux ](s)
≤ γP (·|s, σ(i)aux(s))⊤
(
v(i−1) − v[σ∞(i−1)aux ]
)
+ ǫ(i)(s, σ(i)aux(s))
as desired.
With an inductive application of the above lemma, we obtain the following corollary, which
states an upper bound between the difference of v(R) and v[σ
∞(R)
aux ]. It connects the upper bound
with a recursive propagation of the error.
Corollary 4.8.
v(R) − v[σ∞(R)aux ] ≤ γRP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(1)aux(v(0) − v∗)
+
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux ǫ(i)
σ
(i)
aux
.
By this corollary, we know that the major error accumulation term is the second term.
4.3.2 Error Accumulation
We now consider the error accumulation in the sequence. As will show shortly, we relate ǫ(i) to
the variance vector
√
var(v[σ
∞(i−1)
aux ]) ∈ RS×A, where var(v)[s, a] := vars′∼P (·|s,a)[v(s′)], ∀(s, a),v.
Therefore, it suffices to consider the following bound.
Lemma 4.9.
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux
√
var(v[σ
∞(i−1)
aux ])σ(i)aux
≤
√√√√R R∑
i=1
γ2(R−i)P σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux var(v[σ∞(i−1)aux ])σ(i)aux
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Proof. Follows from Cauchy-Schwarz and that the P matrices are non-negative with each row
summing to 1.
The following lemma establishes a Bellman-like equation for the variance vector of a Markovian
strategy.
Lemma 4.10. For any Markovian strategy π∞ = (π(0), π(1), . . . , ), we have, for all s ∈ S
var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(s))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s] = [ ∞∑
t=0
γ2(t+1)P pi
(0)
P pi
(1)
P pi
(2)
. . .P pi
(t−1)
var[v(π∞(t+1))]pi(t)
]
(s)
(8)
Proof.
var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s] = E[( ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2∣∣∣∣s0 = s]− E[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s]2.
For the second term, we have
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s]2 = v[π∞(0)]2(s) = r(s, π(0)(s))2
+ γ2(P pi
(0)
v[π∞(1)])2(s) + 2γr(s, π(0)(s))(P pi
(0)
v[π∞(1)])(s).
For the first term, we have( ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2
= r(s, π(0)(s))2 + 2r(s, π(0)(s))
( ∞∑
t=1
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)
+
( ∞∑
t=1
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2
Note that
E
[( ∞∑
t=1
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2∣∣∣∣s0 = s]
= E
[( ∞∑
t=1
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2∣∣∣∣s0 = s]− γ2∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v2[π∞(1)](s′) + γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v2[π∞(1)](s′)
= γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+1, π(t+1)(s))
∣∣∣∣s1 = s′]+ γ2∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v2[π∞(1)](s′)
Combining the above two equations, we have,
E
[( ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
)2∣∣∣∣s0 = s] = r(s, π(0)(s))2 + 2γr(s, π(0)(s))∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v[π∞(1)](s′)
+ γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+1, π(t+1)(s))
∣∣∣∣s1 = s′]
+ γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v2[π∞(1)](s′)
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We thus obtain
var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, π(t)(st))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s] = γ2∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+1, π(t+1)(s))
∣∣∣∣s1 = s′]
+ γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)v2[π∞(1)](s′)− γ2(P pi(0)v[π∞(1)])2(s)
= γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+1, π(t+1)(s))
∣∣∣∣s1 = s′]+ γ2var((v[π∞(1)]))pi(0)
Let LHS and RHS be the left hand side and right hand side of (8) respectively. Then we have,
LHS = γ2
∑
s′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+1, π(t+1)(s))
∣∣∣∣s1 = s′]+ γ2var((v[π∞(1)]))pi(0)
= γ4
∑
s′,s′′
P pi
(0)
(s′|s)P pi(1)(s′′|s′)var
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st+2, π(t+2)(s))
∣∣∣∣s2 = s′′]+ γ4P pi(0)var((v[π∞(2)]))pi(1)
+ γ2var((v[π∞(1)]))pi(0) .
Applying the above equality recursively for var((v[π∞(i)])) completes the proof.
Based on the above two lemmas, we immediately obtain the following worst-case bound for the
error accumulation.
Corollary 4.11.√√√√R R∑
i=1
γ2(R−i)P σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux var(v[σ∞(i−1)aux ])σ(i)aux ≤
√
R
γ2(1− γ)2 .
Proof. We use that
[ R∑
i=1
γ2(R−i)P σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux var(v[σ∞(i−1)aux ])σ(R−i)aux
]
(s)
≤ 1
γ2
· var
[ ∞∑
i=0
γir(si, σ(R−i)aux (s))
∣∣∣∣s0 = s].
Since
∑∞
i=0 γ
ir(si, σ
(i)
aux(s)) ≤ (1− γ)−1, we have var(v[σ∞(i−1)aux ])σ(R−i)aux ≤ (1− γ)
−2 as desired.
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4.3.3 Putting Everything Together
Proof of Proposition 4.4. By Corollary 4.8, we have,
v(R) − v∗ ≤ v(R) − v[σ(R)aux] ≤ γRP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(1)aux(v(0) − v∗)
+
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux ǫ(i)
σ
(i)
aux
≤ u/4 +
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux ǫ(i)
σ
(i)
aux
1©
,
where the first inequality holds for sufficiently large R. Consider the second term. Since
ǫ(i) =
√
L · var(v(0))/m+ β · (L/m)3/4 + u/(CR).
We bound
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux · β · (L/m)3/4 ≤ Rβ · (L/m)3/4
and
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux · u/(CR) ≤ Ru/(CR).
We thus have,
1© ≤
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux
√
L · var(v(0))
σ
(i)
aux
/m+Rβ · (L/m)3/4 +R · u/(CR).
Note that √
var(v(0))
σ
(i)
aux
≤
√
var(vσ
(i−1)
aux )
σ
(i)
aux
+ ‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(0)‖∞.
Now consider
‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(0)‖∞ ≤ ‖v(0) − v(R)‖∞ + ‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(i−1)‖∞.
We bound ‖v(0) − v(R)‖∞ ≤ u. Applying Corollary 4.8 again, we have
‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(i−1)‖∞ ≤ u/4 +
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux ǫ(i)
σ
(i)
aux
≤ u/4 +
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux
√
L · var(v(0))
σ
(i)
aux
/m
+Rβ · (L/m)3/4 +R · u/(CR)
With a natural bound, var[v(0)] ≤ β2 · 1, we have
‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(0)‖∞ ≤ u+ ‖v[σ(i−1)aux ]− v(i−1)‖∞ ≤ Rβ
√
L/m+Rβ(L/m)3/4 + u/C ′
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for some constant C ′ > 0. Therefore,
v(R) − v∗ ≤
R∑
i=1
γR−iP σ
(R)
aux · P σ(R−1)aux · . . .P σ(i+1)aux
√
Lvar(v[σ
(i−1)
aux ])pi(i)aux
m
+R
(
Rβ
√
L
m
+Rβ
( L
m
)3/4
+
u
C ′
)
·
√
L
m
+
u
4
+
u
C
+Rβ ·
( L
m
)3/4
≤
√
LRβ2
γ2m
+R
(
Rβ
√
L
m
+Rβ
( L
m
)3/4
+
u
C ′
)
·
√
L
m
+
u
4
+
u
C
+Rβ ·
( L
m
)3/4
≤ u/2
for large enough constants, C, and that in m.
4.4 Algorithm that Computes a Monotone Sequence
Here we show that Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2 computes an MDVSS or MIVSS respectively.
Proposition 4.12. Let u ∈ (0, β], β = (1 − γ)−1, δ ∈ (0, 1), and R = Θ[β log(β/u)]. Further,
let L = Θ(log[δ−1βR|S||A|]), and m = Ω(β3 · max(u−2, 1) · log(|S||A|δ−1)). Then there exists an
algorithm, on input a stochastic game with a generative model with a sampling oracle, G = (S :=
Smin∪Smax,P , r, γ), a value-strategy pair (π(0),v(0)) satisfying Tpi(0) [v(0)] ≤ v(0),T [v(0)] ≤ v(0) (or
Tpi(0) [v(0)] ≥ v(0),T [v(0)] ≥ v(0)), and ‖v(0) − v∗‖∞ ≤ u for some u > 0, outputs, with probability
at least 1− δ, an MDVSS (or MIVSS) {v(i),Q(i), π(i), ǫ(i)}Ri=0 by querying
Z = O
[|S||A| · (m+Rβ2 log[R|S||A|δ−1])]
samples, where
ǫ(i) =
√
Lσ
v
(0)/m+ β · (L/m)3/4 + u/(CR),
for some large constant C > 1 and σ
v
(0) := var[v(0)] is the variance vector for vector v(0). The
algorithms uses space O(|S||A|) and halts in time O(Z).
This section is devoted to proving Proposition 4.12. The algorithm of obtaining MDVSS and
MIVSS is provided in Algorithm 1 and 2.
The Good Events Suppose we are given an arbitrary input vector v−(0),v+(0) ∈ [0, (1− γ)−1]S
with v∗ − u1 ≤ v−(0) ≤ v∗ ≤ v+(0) ≤ v∗ + u1, v−(0) ≤ T [v−(0)], v−(0) ≤ Tpi− [v−(0)], T [v+(0)] ≤
v+(0) and Tpi+ [v+(0)] ≤ v+(0). Since the algorithm is randomized, to begin our analysis, we define
a sequence of events for the iterates. We will show that these events happen with high probability
via concentration inequalities.
Definition 4.13. Let w˜− and w˜+ be the estimate defined in Line 18 (of Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2
respectively). Denote α1 ← L/m1 ≤ 1. Let E0 be the event that
|w˜± −Pv±(0)| ≤ √α1σv±(0) + α3/41 · ‖v±(0)‖∞ · 1 . (9)
For each i > 0, let g˜±(i) be given in Line 35. Let Ei be the event that
|g˜±(i) − P [v±(i) − v±(0)]| ≤ C(1− γ)u · 1 . (10)
for some sufficiently small constant C > 0.
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Lemma 4.14. For some sufficiently large constant c in L, Pr[E0] ≥ 1−O(δ/R).
Proof. Note that ‖v±(0)‖∞ ≤ (1 − γ)−1. By a straightforward application of a Hoeffding bound
and Bernstein inequality and a union bound over all (s, a), we reach the desired inequality. More
details can be find in the proof of Lemma 5.1 in Sidford et al. (2018a).
The Implications of the Good Events We now illustrate the consequences of these good
events.
Lemma 4.15 (Implications of E0). On E0, we have, for all (s, a) ∈ S ×A,
0 ≤ r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)⊤v−(0) −Q−(0)(s, a) ≤ 2√α1σv−(0) + 2α3/41 ‖v−(0)‖∞ and
0 ≤ Q−(0)(s, a) ≤ Q∗(s, a),
and
0 ≤ Q+(0)(s, a)− r(s, a)− γP (·|s, a)⊤v+(0) ≤ 2√α1σv+(0) + 2α3/41 ‖v+(0)‖∞ and
Q∗(s, a) ≤ Q+(0)(s, a) ≤ β,
where α1 = L/m1.
Proof. We prove the first inequality and the second inequality follows similarly. Condition on E0,
we have
|r + γw˜− − r − γPv−(0)| ≤ √α1σv−(0) + α3/41 ‖v−(0)‖∞.
Since
Q−(0) = max
[
r + γw˜− −√α1σv−(0) − α3/41 ‖v−(0)‖∞,0
]
,
we have
0 ≤ r + γPv−(0) −Q−(0) ≤ 2√α1σv−(0) + 2α3/41 ‖v−(0)‖∞.
Moreover, since v(0) ≤ v∗, we have
Q−(0) ≤ r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)⊤v−(0) ≤ Q∗,
completing the proof.
Lemma 4.16 (Implications of Ei, (1)). Then for any i > 0, conditioning on E0, E1, . . . , ER, we have
{v−(i),Q−(i), π−(i), ξ−(i)}Ri=0 is an MIVSS and {v+(i),Q+(i), π+(i), ξ+(i)}Ri=0 is an MDVSS where
ξ±(i) = 2
√
α1σv±(0) + 2[α
3/4
1 β + C(1− γ)u] · 1
for some sufficiently small C > 0.
Proof. We prove the first part of the lemma, i.e., {v−(i),Q−(i), π−(i), ξ−(i)}Ri=0 is an MIVSS. Then
the second part follows similarly. It is clear from the definition (Line 32) that
v−(0) ≤ v−(1) . . . ≤ v−(R).
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To prove property 1 of MIVSS, we need additionally to show
v−(R) ≤ v∗.
This follows if property 2, i.e.,
∀i ∈ [0, R] : v−(i) ≤ Tpi−(i) [v−(i)], v−(i) ≤ T [v−(i)].
Indeed,
v−(i) ≤ T [v−(i)] ≤ T 2[v−(i)] . . . ≤ T ∞[v−(i)] = v∗.
We now prove property 2 by induction on i. It immediately follows from the initial condition that
v−(0) ≤ Tpi−(0) [v−(0)], v−(0) ≤ T [v−(0)].
Suppose this property holds for all 0, 1, . . . , i − 1 for some i > 1. We now consider the case i. Let
Q˜
−(i)
= r + γPv−(i−1). Since ‖g˜−(i) − P (v−(i−1) − v−(0))‖∞ ≤ C(1− γ)ǫ, we have
|Q˜−(i) − r − γw−(i−1) − γg−(i−1)| ≤ ξ−(i)/2. (11)
Since
Q−(i)(s, a)y = max
[
r(s, a) + γw−(i−1)(s, a) + γg−(i−1)(s, a), 0
]
≤ r(s, a) + γP (·|s, a)⊤v−(i−1)
= Q˜
−(i)
(s, a)
we have, for any s ∈ S
min
a
Q−(i)(s, a) ≤ min
a
Q˜
−(i)
(s, a) and max
a
Q−(i)(s, a) ≤ max
a
Q˜
−(i)
(s, a).
For each s ∈ S, denote
v˜−(i)(s) = Q−(i)(s, π˜−(i)(s)),
where π˜−(i) is given in Line 29 (that achieves maxaQ
−(i)(s, a) or minaQ
−(i)(s, a)). To show v−(i) ≤
T [v−(i)] and v−(i) ≤ Tpi−(i) [v−(i)], we do a case analysis for a state in S. Firstly, we consider state
s ∈ Smin. For each state s ∈ Smin, note that π˜−(i)(s) := argminaQ−(i)(s, a). By Line 32, v−(i)(s)
and π−(i)(s) have the following two possibilities,
1. v−(i−1)(s) ≤ v˜−(i)(s) ⇒ v−(i)(s) = v˜−(i)(s) and π−(i)(s) = π˜−(i)(s);
2. v−(i−1)(s) > v˜−(i)(s) ⇒ v−(i)(s) = v−(i−1)(s) and π−(i)(s) = π−(i−1)(s).
Considering case 1., we have,
v−(i)(s) = Q−(i−1)(s, π−(i)(s)) ≤ min
a
Q˜
−(i)
(s, a) = T [v−(i−1)](s) ≤ T [v−(i)](s) and
v−(i)(s) = Q−(i−1)(s, π−(i)(s)) ≤ Q˜−(i)(s, π−(i)(s)) = Tpi−(i) [v−(i−1)](s) ≤ Tpi−(i) [v−(i)](s).
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Considering case 2., we have, by induction hypothesis v−(i−1)(s) ≤ T [v−(i−1)](s), v−(i−1)(s) ≤
Tpi−(i−1) [v−(i−1)](s). Thus
v−(i)(s) ≤ T [v−(i−1)](s) ≤ T [v−(i)](s) ,
v−(i)(s) ≤ Tpi(i−1) [v−(i−1)](s) ≤ Tpi−(i−1) [v−(i)](s) = Tpi−(i)[v−(i)](s).
It follows similarly for the case of s ∈ Smax (by just replacing the min by max in the above
argument). This completes the induction step and hence the property 2.
We now prove property 3 and 4. By Equation 11, we immediately have,
Q−(i) ≥ r + γP (v−(i))− ξ−(i)
proving property 3. Lastly, by Line 32, we have
v−(i) ≥ T [Q−(i)],
completing the proof of property 4 and the lemma.
The Probability of Good Events Note that the random samples in the successive improvement
phase are independent with event E0. We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.17. Suppose the algorithm does not halt at iteration i ≥ 1, then,
Pr[Ei|E0, E1, . . . , Ei−1] ≥ 1−O(δ/R).
Proof. On E0, E1, . . . , Ei−1, we have v−(0) ≤ v−(i) ≤ v∗ ≤ v+(i) ≤ v+(0), thus ‖v±(i) − v±(0)‖ ≤ u.
Applying Hoeffding bound, Bernstein’s inequality and a union bound over all (s, a), we have that
with probability at least 1−O(δ/R), ‖g(i)−P [v(i)−v(0)]‖∞ ≤ (1−γ)ǫ/32, completing the proof.
Therefore, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.18. Let R = ⌈c1β ln[βǫ−1]⌉ be an integer for some constant c1. Then, with probability
at least 1−O(δ), E0, {Ei}Ri=1 all happen.
Proof. By a straightforward calculation, we have
Pr[∩Ri=0Ei] = Pr[E0] Pr[E1|E0] Pr[E2|E0, E1] . . .Pr[ER|E0, E1, . . . , ER−1] ≥ 1−O(δ).
Putting It Together
Proof of Proposition 4.12. Let E = ∩Ri=0Ei, we have shown, on E , the outputs of Algorithm 1 and
2, {v−(i),Q−(i), π−(i), ξ−(i)}Ri=0 is an MIVSS and {v+(i),Q+(i), π+(i), ξ+(i)}Ri=0 is an MDVSS. By
the above lemmas, E happens with probability at least 1 − Θ(δ). This completes the proof of the
proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. The theorem is proved by combining Proposition 4.3, 4.4, and 4.12.
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Algorithm 1 QVI-MDVSS: algorithm for computing monotone decreasing value-strategy se-
quences.
1: Input: A generative model for stochastic game, M = (S,A, r,P , γ);
2: Input: Precision parameter u ∈ [0, (1− γ)−1], and error probability δ ∈ (0, 1);
3: Input: Initial values v+(0), σ+(0) that satisfies monotonicity:
v∗ ≤ v+(0) ≤ v∗ + u 1, v+(0) ≥ T [v+(0)], and v+(0) ≥ Tσ+(0) [v+(0)]; (5)
4: Output: {v+(i),Q+(i), σ+(i), ξ+(i)}Ri=0 which is an MDVSS with probability at least 1− δ;
5:
6: INITIALIZATION:
7: Let c1, c2, c3, c be some tunable absolute constants;
8: \\Initialize constants:
9: β ← (1− γ)−1, and R← ⌈c1β ln[βu−1]⌉;
10: m1 ← c2β3 ·min(1, u−2) · log(8|S||A|δ−1);
11: m2 ← c3β2 log[2R|S||A|δ−1];
12: α1 ← L/m1 where L = c log(|S||A|δ−1(1 − γ)−1u−1);
13: \\Obtain an initial batch of samples:
14: For each (s, a) ∈ S ×A: obtain independent samples s(1)s,a, s(2)s,a, . . . , s(m1)s,a from P (·|s, a);
15: Initialize: w+ = w˜+ = σ̂+ = Q+(0) = Q+(1) ← β · 1S×A and i← 0;
16: for each (s, a) ∈ S ×A do
17: \\Compute empirical estimates of P⊤s,av+(0) and var(v+(0))(s, a):
18: w˜
+(s, a)← 1m1
∑m1
j=1 v
+(0)(s
(j)
s,a);
19: σ̂
+(s, a)← 1m1
∑m1
j=1(v
+(0))2(s
(j)
s,a)− (w˜+)2(s, a) ;
20: \\Shift the empirical estimate to have one-sided error and guarantee monotonicity:
21: w+(s, a)← w˜+(s, a) +
√
α1σ̂
+(s, a) + α
3/4
1 β
22: \\Compute coarse estimate of the Q-function and make sure its value is in [0, β]:
23: Q+(0)(s, a)← min[r(s, a) + γw+(s, a), β]
24: end for
25:
26: REPEAT: \\successively improve
27: for i = 1 to R do
28: \\Compute the one-step dynamic programming:
29: Let v+(i) ← v˜+(i) ← T [Q+(i−1)], σ+(i) ← σ˜+(i) ← σ(Q+(i−1));
30: \\Compute strategy and value and maintain monotonicity:
31: For each s ∈ S if v+(i)(s) ≥ v+(i−1)(s), then v+(i)(s)← v+(i−1)(s) and σ+(i)(s)← σ+(i−1)(s);
32: \\Obtaining a small batch of samples:
33: For each (s, a) ∈ S ×A: draw independent samples s˜(1)s,a, s˜(2)s,a, . . . , s˜(m2)s,a from P (·|s, a);
34: \\Compute the expected value, g±(i), the estimate of P [v±(i) − v±(0)] with one-sided error:
35: Let g˜+(i)(s, a)← 1m2
∑m2
j=1
[
v+(i)(s˜
(j)
s,a)− v+(0)(s˜(j)s,a)
]
;
36: Let g+(i)(s, a)← g˜+(i)(s, a) + C(1 − γ)u, where C > 0 is an absolute constant;
37: \\Estimate the approximation error:
38: ξ
+(i) ← 2√α1σv+(0) + 2[α3/41 β + C(1− γ)u] · 1
39: \\Improve Q+(i) and make sure its value is in [0, β]:
40: Q+(i+1) ← min
[
r + γ · [w+ + g+(i)], β
]
;
41: end for
42: return {v+(i),Q+(i), σ+(i), ξ+(i)}Ri=0
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Algorithm 2 QVI-MIVSS: algorithm for computing monotone increasing value-strategy sequences.
1: Input: A generative model for stochastic game M = (S,A, r,P , γ);
2: Input: Precision parameter u ∈ [0, (1− γ)−1]; and error probability δ ∈ (0, 1)
3: Input: Initial values v−(0), π−(0) that satisfies monotonicity:
v∗ − u 1 ≤ v−(0) ≤ v∗, v−(0) ≤ T v−(0), and v−(0) ≤ Tpi−(0)v−(0);
4: Output: {v−(i),Q−(i), π−(i), ξ−(i)}Ri=0 which is an MIVSS with high probability.
5:
6: INITIALIZATION:
7: Let c1, c2, c3, c be some tunable absolute constants;
8: \\Initialize constants:
9: β ← (1− γ)−1, and R← ⌈c1β ln[βu−1]⌉;
10: m1 ← c2β3 ·min(1, u−2) · log(8|S||A|δ−1);
11: m2 ← c3β2 log[2R|S||A|δ−1];
12: α1 ← L/m1 where L = c log(|S||A|δ−1(1 − γ)−1ǫ−1);
13: \\Obtain an initial batch of samples:r
14: For each (s, a) ∈ S ×A: obtain independent samples s(1)s,a, s(2)s,a, . . . , s(m1)s,a from P (·|s, a);
15: Initialize: w− = w˜− = σ̂− = Q−(0) = Q−(1) ← 0S×A and i← 0;
16: for each (s, a) ∈ S ×A do
17: \\Compute empirical estimates of P⊤s,av−(0) and var(v−(0))(s, a):
18: w˜
−(s, a)← 1m1
∑m1
j=1 v
−(0)(s
(j)
s,a);
19: σ̂
−(s, a)← 1m1
∑m1
j=1(v
−(0))2(s
(j)
s,a)− (w˜−)2(s, a) ;
20: \\Shift the empirical estimate to have one-sided error and guarantee monotonicity:
21: w−(s, a)← w˜−(s, a)−
√
α1σ̂
−(s, a)− α3/41 β;
22: \\Compute coarse estimate of the Q-function and make sure its value is in [0, β]:
23: Q−(1)(s, a)← clip[r(s, a) + γw−(s, a), 0, β]
24: end for
25:
26: REPEAT: \\successively improve
27: for i = 1 to R do
28: \\Compute the one-step dynamic programming:
29: Let v−(i) ← v˜−(i) ← TQ−(i−1), π−(i) ← π˜−(i) ← π(Q−(i−1));
30: \\Compute strategy and value and maintain monotonicity:
31: For each s ∈ S:
32: if v−(i)(s) ≤ v−(i−1)(s), then v−(i)(s)← v−(i−1)(s) and π−(i)(s)← π−(i−1)(s);
33: \\Obtaining a small batch of samples:
34: For each (s, a) ∈ S ×A: draw independent samples s˜(1)s,a, s˜(2)s,a, . . . , s˜(m2)s,a from P (·|s, a);
35: \\Compute the expected value, g±(i), the estimate of P [v±(i) − v±(0)] with one-sided error:
36: Let g˜−(i)(s, a)← 1m2
∑m2
j=1
[
v−(i)(s˜
(j)
s,a)− v−(0)(s˜(j)s,a)
]
;
37: Let g−(i)(s, a)← g˜−(i)(s, a)− C(1 − γ)u, where C is sufficiently small;
38: \\Estimate the approximation error:
39: ξ−(i) ← 2√α1σv−(0) + 2[α3/41 β + C(1 − γ)u] · 1
40: \\Improve Q−(i) make sure its value is in [0, β]:
41: Q−(i+1) ← clip
[
r + γ · [w− + g−(i)], 0, β
]
;
42: end for
43: return {v−(i),Q−(i), π−(i), ξ−(i)}Ri=0
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